Yemen: reported US covert actions 2001-2011

Key US counter-terrorism actions in Yemen
The US Department of Defense is primarily responsible for counter-terrorism activities in Yemen, just as it is in Somalia. CENTCOM is the lead Pentagon command. Joint Special Operations Command – or JSOC – is the elite force often credited with attacks in Yemen aimed at al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and more recently, Ansar al-Sharia.

US activity has at various times consisted of cruise missile strikes, naval bombardments, air strikes and more recently, drone strikes launched from Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti and elsewhere. Attacks are at times in conjunction with, or in support of, the Yemen military.

Click here for our 2012 Yemen data.

Click here for our 2013 Yemen data.

Click here for our 2014 Yemen data.

The CIA has only recently taken a more aggressive role, reportedly operating a drone fleet from a secret base ‘somewhere in the Gulf.’ Actions against alleged militants are at times combined operations involving both the CIA and JSOC, for example with the killing of Anwar al Awlaki in September 2011.

As Yemen came under severe pressure during the Arab Spring and militants seized control of cities and towns in the south, the US significantly stepped up its attacks, most notably with drone strikes.

The Data
The events detailed below are those actions which have been reported by US administration and intelligence officials, credible media, academics and other sources since 2001. The Bureau will continue to add to its knowledge base, and welcomes input and corrections from interested parties.

Many of the US attacks have been confirmed by senior American or Yemeni officials. However some events are only speculatively attributed to the US, or are indicative of US involvement. For example precision night-time strikes on moving vehicles, whilst often attributed to the Yemen Air Force, are more likely to be the work of US forces. We therefore class all strikes in Yemen as either ‘confirmed’ or ‘possible’.

Both the Pentagon and CIA have been operating drones over Yemen. But the US has also launched strikes with other weapons systems, including conventional jet aircraft and cruise missiles. The Bureau records these operations as ‘additional US attacks’.

Covert US operations, Yemen 2001-2011
Confirmed drone strikes Possible drone strikes Additional US attacks
Total reported strikes: 12-15 10-12 7-44
Total reported killed: 52-108 37-40 120-222
Civilians reported killed: 36 3-5 47-76
Children reported killed: 2 2 21-23
Total reported injured: 14-41 13-14 11-64

Note: only one of these strikes took place before December 2009 – a confirmed US drone strike on November 3 2002 (YEM001).


November 25-27 2001
Yemen’s President Saleh signed a $400m deal with the Bush administration, as part of which the US created a ‘counter-terrorism camp’ in Yemen run by the CIA, US Marines and Special Forces. The deal was made with CIA Director George Tenet, who ‘provided Saleh’s forces with helicopters, eavesdropping equipment and 100 Army Special Forces members to train an anti-terrorism unit. He also won Saleh’s approval to fly Predator drones armed with Hellfire missiles over the country’. According to journalist and military expert Jeremy Scahill the Yemen camp was backed up by Camp Lemonier in Djibouti, which housed Predator drones. Among the forces inserted alongside the trainers were members of a clandestine military intelligence unit within the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) known as The Activity. While officially in Yemen as trainers, they also reportedly began to find and track al Qaeda suspects.

Location: Yemen
References: The Nation, Washington Post, Yemen Government

December 2001
Reports claimed that plans were drawn up for British SAS troops to carry out a series of ‘stiletto’, or pin pointed attacks on al Qaeda camps in Yemen, should the US decide that UK forces were required. A report in the Scottish Herald in March 2002 suggested that the US wished to use the UK troops for their ‘unrivaled expertise’, and ‘to defuse growing anti-American feeling’ among Yemeni warlords. The reports marked the first of many claims that British Special Forces were carrying out counter-terror operations in Yemen.

Location: Yemen
References: The Daily Telegraph, The Herald


March 15 2002
During a visit by US Vice President Dick Cheney, Yemen confirmed the expanded US Special Forces presence of around 100 troops (see YEM001), and to allowing them to train its Republican Guard. ‘In Yemen, we are working with the government to prevent al Qaeda forces from regrouping there,’ Mr Cheney said in Egypt. An adviser to Yemen’s President Saleh told the New York Times:

People are understanding the importance of having trainers. They do not want the Americans to come in and do the fighting. They feel it is the Yemenis who should fight against terrorism.’

References: New York TimesBetween Threats and War (Zenko), BBC

April 10 2002
Yemen was officially designated a ‘combat zone’ in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, allowing the US to begin deployment of US Special Forces. It was listed as part of the Afghanistan combat zone.

To qualify as part of the Afghanistan OEF sphere, servicemembers must be serving in Pakistan, Tajikistan, or Jordan (as of September 19, 2001); Incirlik Air Base in Turkey (as of September 21, 2001); Uzbekistan or Kyrgyzstan (as of October 1, 2001); the Philippines (as of January 9, 2002); Yemen (as of April 10, 2002); or Djibouti (as of July 1, 2002).

References: US Internal Revenue ServiceBetween Threats and War (Zenko), Congressional Research Service

September 19 2002
The US was reported to have moved some 800 troops, including up to 200 elite Special Forces troops to Djibouti along with an amphibious assault ship, the USS Belleau Wood, in readiness ‘for rapid deployment against al Qaeda in Yemen.’ The Yemeni Government denied that it would allow US troops to take part in any operations on its territory.

ReferencesDaily Telegraph, New York Times, BBC

November 3 2002
♦ 6 reported killed

In the first known US targeted assassination using a drone, a CIA Predator launched from Djibouti struck a car killing six al Qaeda suspects. A seventh individual may have escaped. The dead included Al Qaeda leader Qa’id Salim Sinan al Harithi, also known as Abu Mi (one of the alleged masterminds behind the USS Cole attack) and Abu Ahmad al Hijazi, a naturalised US citizen also known as Kemal or Kamal Darwish. Darwish, a US-born Yemeni, was suspected of being the recruiter of a terror support cell that had been rounded up in Buffalo, New York state. The other four killed reportedly belonged to the Aden-Abyan Islamic Army, and were identified as Salih Hussain Ali al Nunu or Zono (aka Abu Humam); Awsan Ahmad al Tarihi (aka Abu al Jarrah); Munir Ahmad Abdallah al Sauda (Abu Ubaidah); and Adil Nasir al Sauda (Abu Usamah, initially identified as al-Qia’gaa). All six names were released by the Yemen government three weeks after the attack. 

Harithi was allegedly traced after using a mobile phone that US intelligence had linked to him. A truck-mounted listening device in Kuwait intercepted the call. A JSOC signals intelligence team also participated. In a leaked diplomatic cable from 2004, the US Ambassador to Yemen told an Amnesty International delegation that:

The action was taken in full cooperation with the ROYG [Republic of Yemen Government], against known al Qaeda operatives after previous attempts to apprehend the terrorists left 18 Yemenis dead. Citing the progress on both rights and security, the Ambassador commented that Yemen is an example of how counter-terrorism efforts and human rights can be mutually reinforcing.

The CIA and Centcom co-operated on the strike, with the drone reportedly launched from a base in nearby Djibouti. According to Lt General Michael DeLong, deputy head of Centcom at the time: ‘George Tenet [director CIA] calls me one morning and said, “We’ve got our target.”  I said, “OK, we’re good. I’m going down to the UAV room.” [in Tampa, Florida]. I’m sitting back like this, looking at the wall and talking to George Tenet. And he goes, “You going to make the call?” And I said, “I’ll make the call.” He says, “This SUV over here is the one that has Ali in it.” I said, “OK, fine.” You know, “Shoot him.” They lined it up and shot it. It’s a pretty good-size explosive. In an SUV, you can imagine a big explosion. So we knew everybody in the vehicle was dead.’

Paul Wolfowitz, assistant US Secretary of Defense, appeared to admit to CNN five days later that the strike was the work of the CIA. Reporter Paula Ressa asked him whether ‘in terms of strategy, what we saw in Yemen, for example with the CIA strike. Is that change in strategy now?’ Wolfowitz responded: ‘Not fundamentally. It’s a very successful tactical operation, and one hopes each time you get a success like that, not only to have gotten rid of somebody dangerous but to have imposed changes in their tactics and operations and procedures.’ It would be 10 years before a US official – on that occasion President Obama – would again admit on the record to the US targeted killing programme.

Type of action: Air assault, drone strike
Location: Marib Province
References: BBC, TIME, Los Angeles Times, New York Times, The Nation, The Age, The Tech, The Atlantic, Washington Post, CNN, Wikileaks cable, Amnesty International, UNHCHRChristian Science Monitor, New Yorker, UN Human Rights Council, New Yorker, CBS News, Gulf News, BBC News, CNN (via US government archive), Nasser al-Aulaki v. Barack Obama et al, Middle East Online, ABC News, PBS Frontline, Council on Foreign Relations, PBS Frontline, Washington Post


January 13 2003
The UN’s Special Rapporteur on Extra Judicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Ms Asma Jahangir, issued her first report on US drone strikes outside the battlefield, in the wake of the November 2002 attack, which she described as ‘a truly disturbing development’. The report notes:

In its letter the Government of Yemen acknowledges that the attack did take place, and gives the names of the six persons killed [see YEM001]. It further informs the Special Rapporteur that the six men had been involved in the attacks on the United States military vessel, the USS Cole, as well as a French tanker out of the port of Aden. It is further reported that the Government on several occasions had, unsuccessfully, sought to apprehend these six individuals. The Government stresses that had the persons come forward all their rights would have been protected, including a fair trial and a defence lawyer during trial. At the time of writing the United States Government had not sent a reply. The Special Rapporteur is extremely concerned that should the information received be accurate, an alarming precedent might have been set for extrajudicial execution by consent of Government. The Special Rapporteur acknowledges that Governments have a responsibility to protect their citizens against the excesses of non-State actors or other authorities, but these actions must be taken in accordance with international human rights and humanitarian law. In the opinion of the Special Rapporteur, the attack in Yemen constitutes a clear case of extrajudicial killing.

Location: Geneva
References: UN Special Rapporteur

April 14 2003
The United States responded to the UN Human Rights Council. Stating that it had ‘no comment on the specific allegations and findings concerning a November 2002 incident in Yemen, or the accuracy thereof’, the US also claimed that the UN had no jurisdiction: ‘The Government of the United States respectfully submits that inquiries relating to allegations stemming from any military operations conducted during the course of an armed conflict with al Qaida do not fall within the mandate of the Special Rapporteur.’

Locations: Washington/ Geneva
Reference: UN Special Rapporteur


Spring 2004

US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld issued the secret Al Qaeda Network Executive Order, better known as AQN ExOrd, authorising worldwide anti-Al Qaeda activities by US Special Forces, including in Yemen.

Location: Washington
ReferencesNew York Times, New York Times 


November 9 2005
President Saleh arrived in Washington on a state visit ‘with a wish list‘ of rewards for being ‘an indispensable ally.’ He had eliminated every name on a list of al Qaeda leaders the CIA had given him in 2001. And in 2005 he swiftly dealt with a terrorist cell threatening to attack the US embassy in Sanaa. He ‘needed to replenish his armoury’ with US help to fight the third war in three years with Houthi secessionists in the north. But, according to Foreign Policy, Saleh had been so successful at tackling al Qaeda that Washington’s priority in Yemen had shifted from counter-terrorism to promoting democracy. Al Qaeda was yesterday’s problem the US explained. With little sign of political reform in Yemen coupled insidious corruption, the State Department cut aid to Sanaa by $20m. The World Bank also slashed aid from $420m to $280m because of government corruption. Saleh ‘finally lost it’ on the flight back to Yemen after his three day visit. He fired his entire team of economic advisors within minutes of take-off. Weeks later however, ‘when Saleh had calmed down, he rehired most of them.’

Location: Washington
Reference: Foreign Policy


February 3 2006
Twenty three suspected and convicted al Qaeda militants escaped a maximum-security prison outside Sanaa. They tunneled from their cell to a nearby mosque where they said their morning prayers and walked out the front door. This was ‘AQAP’s genesis moment‘. Among the 23 was Jamal Ahmed Badawi who had been sentenced to death in 2004 for his part in the 2000 bombing of the USS Cole. One of the bombers of the French tanker MV Limburg, Fawaz al-Rabeei, also escaped as did ten more convicted al Qaeda militants. The US intelligence agencies believed the escapees had inside help. But they ‘could only guess at the extent of the conspiracy’. The US had announced aid to Yemen in 2006 would be only $4.6m having ‘decided al Qaeda in Yemen was no longer a threat.’ Through 2006 US attention and aid dollars had to be refocussed on the impoverished state.

Location: Sanaa
Reference: Foreign Policy, New York Times


March 29 2007
Al Qaeda in Yemen assassinated Ali Mahmud Qasaylah, the chief criminal investigator in Marib governrate. The group claimed that Qasaylah was murdered for his role in the November 2002 drone killing of Harithi (YEM001). Yemen’s Ministry of the Interior offered a $25,000 reward for information relating to three named suspects. The attack was the first indication of a resurgent al Qaeda presence in Yemen, as one report put it:

Qasaylah’s death and the subsequent claim of responsibility by al Qaeda in Yemen suggest that the group is reforming with the help of members trained in Iraq and is returning to settle old scores. This could prove to be a dangerous revival of the security threat in Yemen.

Location: Marib
Reference: Asia Times, Jamestown Foundation

March 31 2007
According to diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks, a crashed US Scan Eagle reconnaissance drone was found washed ashore. President Saleh assured the US Navy that this would not become an incident. The secret cable noted:

President Saleh clearly believes the unmanned aircraft had been performing reconnaissance in Yemeni territory when it crashed. He could have taken the opportunity to score political points by appearing tough in public against the United States, but chose instead to blame Iran.

Location: Hadramaut
References: WikiLeaks

October 26 2007
Yemen authorities announced they had released USS Cole bomber Jamal al Badawi (right, from US Wanted List), provoking criticism from Washington. He had handed himself in to authorities in early October 2007 after escaping a high security prison near Sanaa in 2006. Badawi had received a death in 2004 (commuted to 15 years) for his leading roll in the attack on the warship that killed 17 US sailors. Frances Townsend, President Bush’s counterterrorism adviser, was assured by President Saleh that ‘Badawi has promised to give up terrorism’ and under close surveillance. The US was unconvinced and cancelled $20m in aid for the second time.

Location: Sanaa
References: New York Times, Associated Press, Newsweek, Newsweek, Foreign Policy


March 18 2008
Al Qaeda in Yemen fired three mortar rounds at the US Embassy in Sanaa. The mortars missed the Embassy, hitting a nearby school. A school guard was killed, and several Yemeni students and Yemeni government security personnel posted outside the embassy were injured in the attack. The attack prompted the United States and other countries to send non-essential embassy staff home, the New York Times reported.

Type of action: Terrorist attack
Location: Sanaa
References: US Embassy, Reuters, New York TimesUS Department of State

September 17 2008
Al Qaeda in Yemen launched a complex attack on the US Embassy, including a suicide bomber. Militants disguised as soldiers ‘drove up and began firing rifles and rocket-propelled grenades at a checkpoint outside the heavily fortified United States Embassy compound’, then drove through the checkpoint and detonated two car bombs at around 9.15am, reported the New York Times. The attack killed up to 18 people, including 18-year old US citizen Susan Elbaneh, who were waiting to enter the Embassy. Had a Yemeni security contractor not lowered a security bar moments before being shot the Embassy would have been breached, reports Foreign Policy. And according to Ambassador Edward J Hull: ‘The scale of this attack, which rivaled that of the attack on the [USS] Cole, was a wake-up call for all of Washington’. Washington said the attack bore ‘all the hallmarks’ of al Qaeda. Elbaneh was the cousin of Jaber Elbaneh, an alleged member of the ‘Buffalo Six’ group which had trained in Afghanistan at an al Qaeda camp in 2001.

Type of action: Terrorist attack
Location: Sanaa
References: High-Value Target: Countering Al Qaeda in Yemen (p117), US EmbassyReuters, New York Times, US Department of State, Buffalo News, Foreign Policy

Late 2008
A November 2009 CBS news article revealed that the US had been intercepting the communications of American born imam and radical cleric Anwar Al-Awlaki since at least late 2008. Awlaki was allegedly communicating with Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan, the US Army psychiatrist accused of the Fort Hood massacre, which took place on November 5 2009, causing the deaths of 13 people. Hasan attended a Virginia mosque at the time Awlaki was imam. The Telegraph reported: ‘Communications, believed to be emails, were intercepted by US intelligence services. They were examined at the time but it was decided that they did not require following up.’

Location: Online
References: CBS, The Telegraph, New York Times, Empty Wheel


Al Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) announces its foundation by video (photo courtesy Channel 4 News)

January 24 2009
Two Gulf al Qaeda ‘franchises’ – from Yemen and Saudi Arabia – announced their merger into Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). According to the Long War Journal ‘the group promised attacks on oil facilities, tourists, and security forces. The statement also said that the governorates of Abyan, Shabwa, Hadhramout, Marib, Al Jawf, and Sa’ada are on the verge of falling into al Qaeda control.’ The new group also declared that it would construct training camps in Yemen for would-be jihadists wanting to fight in Gaza.

Location: Yemen
References: Long War Journal, Channel 4 News

Early February 2009
Yemen’s President Saleh secretly offered the newly rebranded Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula a ceasefire if it stopped attacking Yemeni forces, the US later learned. According to a leaked US diplomatic cable AQAP rejected the offer because it was ‘thriving’:

It is highly likely Salih did indeed offer the truce, as recent information strongly suggests Salih’s most pressing concern remains preserving his own power rather than eradicating Yemen’s thriving extremist community. AQAP’s rejection of the cease-fire highlights the already permissive security environment; AQAP leadership is aware even should ROYG security forces continue their counterterror campaign, such actions are unlikely to significantly affect operational planning and/or execution.

Location: Yemen
References: Wall Street Journal, Long War Journal, Al Nedaa (Arabic), WikiLeaks, Empty Quarter

April 1 2009
According to journalist Jeremy Scahill, General David Petraeus, CENTCOM commander, approved a plan developed with the US Embassy in Sanaa, the CIA and others, ‘to expand US military action in Yemen. The plan not only involved special-ops training for Yemeni forces but unilateral US strikes against AQAP.’

References: The Nation, Senate Armed Services CommitteeWikileaks CableThe Guardian

July 26 2009
In an hour-long meeting at the Presidential Palace in Sanaa on July 26, President Saleh promised CENTCOM Commander General David Petraeus full counter-terrorism cooperation ‘without restrictions or conditions’, including pursuing al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Saleh called AQAP ‘a dangerous poison’ and an ‘epidemic’ and said the Yemeni government was committed to hunting down terrorists in Jawf, Sa’ada, Marib, Abyan and Hadramout governorates. He asked for increased information-sharing with the US government in order to better target AQAP’s leaders.

ReferencesWikileaks CableThe Guardian, New York Times

September 6 2009
Obama’s chief counter-terrorism adviser John Brennan met with President Saleh. A secret diplomatic cable reports that Saleh:

Pledged unfettered access to Yemen’s national territory for US counterterrorism operations, suggesting that in the process, the USG assumed responsibility for the success – or failure – of efforts to neutralize AQAP in Yemen. Saleh expressed dissatisfaction with the USG’s current level of aid for CT and security operations and insisted the ROYG began its war against the al-Houthi rebellion in northern Yemen on behalf of the US.

The cable noted that since 2001 the US had spent $115m equipping Yemen’s counter-terrorism forces.

Location: Sanaa
References: WikiLeaks, Wall Street Journal

September 30 2009
US CENTCOM commander David Petraeus issued an order creating a Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force to ‘plan and execute covert intelligence gathering in support of covert military operations throughout the CENTCOM area.’ It was reportedly an update of Donald Rumsfeld’s AQN ExOrd of spring 2004 and has been described as a ‘permission slip’ for Special Forces teams. As the New York Times’ Mark Mazzetti noted:

Unlike covert actions undertaken by the CIA, such clandestine activity does not require the president’s approval or regular reports to Congress.

Location: Washington
References: New York Times, The Nation

December 17 2009
♦ 55-58 people reported killed
♦ 41 civilians killed in initial strike including 12 women, at least 5 of them pregnant, and 21-22 children. 3-4 also later killed by cluster bombs
♦ 9 injured by cluster bombs after the event

At least one cruise missile loaded with cluster bombs hit the village of al Majala, Abyan province, in the first known US attack in Yemen in seven years. The missile, carrying bomblets filled with incendiary material, allegedly targeted an al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) training camp. But attack killed at least 44 civilians out of 58 people reported dead.

Amnesty later released forensically-verified photos of the remains of a US cruise missile designed to carry cluster bombs, and of cluster bomb fragments. Secret US diplomatic cables obtained by Wikileaks confirmed the US was responsible. Klaidman reported that the deputy US National Security Adviser Tom Donilon, the US ambassador to Yemen and the CIA’s local station chief were among dozens who deliberated on whether to launch the attack.

An extensive investigation by a Yemen parliamentary commission which visited the site found:

Five missiles had been fired, killing 14 members of the al-Haidra family in one settlement and 27 members of the al-Anbour family in the other. The sole survivor from the al-Haidra family, a 13-year-old girl was reported to have been sent abroad to receive medical treatment for her injuries.

Three further civilians later reportedly died (Khaled Mohammed Ali, Nasser Saleh al Soueidi and Mithaq al Jild) and nine were injured after stepping on cluster bombs, which according to Yemen’s parliamentary commission were scattered up to 1.5km from the attack site. (see below for a full list of the dead). The report also concluded that 14 possible militants died, though raised some doubts about the status of those killed.

According to Jeremy Scahill at The Nation, ‘authorization for the strikes was rushed through Saleh’s office because of “actionable” intelligence that Al Qaeda suicide bombers were preparing for strikes in Sana’. Other reports on the strike claimed that a leading al Qaeda figure was killed along with 13 other militants: Saleh Mohammed Ali al Anbouri, also known as al Kazemi, who was a Saudi citizen and reputedly an Al Qaeda deputy. In his book Kill Or Capture Klaidman reports that al Kazemi, codenamed Objective Akron by JSOC, ‘was in the late stages of planning a terrorist attack on the US embassy in Sana’a’ and that as an AQAP operational planner he was also ‘believed to have been responsible for a July 2007 suicide bombing that killed nine people including seven Spanish tourists.’ However the parliamentary committee report noted that locals believed ‘he had moved back to Abyan to start a new life, had acquired sheep and goats, and pledged not to work with al Qaeda anymore.’ The Yemen government conspired to cover up the US role in the attack. At a meeting four days later Yemen’s deputy prime minister told the US ambassador that:

Any evidence of greater US involvement such as fragments of US munitions found at the sites could be explained away as equipment purchased from the US.

In March 2012 al-Jazeera re-examined the strike in detail. Tribal leader Sheikh Saleh bin Fareed said the Yemeni government had claimed the target was an AQAP camp with ‘huge stores for all kinds of weapons and ammunitions and rockets’. But when bin Fareed visited the site, he saw ‘goats and sheep all over…the heads of those who were killed here and there. You see children. And you cannot tell if this meat belongs to animals or to human beings…there is no stores, there is no field for training, there is nobody. Except for a very poor tribe.’ An eyewitness told al Jazeera that ‘most of the dead were women, children and elderly…only three of them were young men. 46 people were killed, including five pregnant women.’ The eyewitness showed al Jazeera photographs of three dead children, and one elderly woman. Another eyewitness, a woman who was making bread when the missiles struck around 6am, lost her husband and at least one child in the attack.

In April 2012 the ACLU and CCR filed a Freedom of Information Act request with the Pentagon demanding further details. Although the US has never publicly admitted its role, Newsweek reported that senior State department lawyer Jeh Johnson was among many who watched it take place on a video screen.

Johnson returned to his Georgetown home around midnight that evening, drained and exhausted. Later there were reports from human-rights groups that dozens of women and children had been killed in the attacks, reports that a military source involved in the operation termed “persuasive.” Johnson would confide to others, “If I were Catholic, I’d have to go to confession.”

Yemeni journalist Abdulelah Haider Shaye, who helped expose the civilian casualties inflicted in the raid, was arrested the following year and remains in detention. President Obama has personally expressed ‘concern’ at the possible release of Shaye, due to his association with Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

Within days of the deadly US strike in Yemen, a 14-man parliamentary commission headed by Sheikh Hamir Ben Abdullah Ben Hussein Al-Ahmar was dispatched from Sanaa to discover what had taken place. That report was presented to Yemen’s parliament on February 7 2010. The government accepted it in full a month later, paying compensation at local rates to affected families, although a Yemen parliamentary spokesman said that  ‘the American authorities did not get involved in this process in any way.’ The report named all civilians killed in the attack, which are here published for the first time in English by the Bureau.

The dead from the Haydara clan:

Family of Mohammed Nasser Awad Jaljala




Mohammed Nasser Awad Jaljala



Nousa Mohammed Saleh El-Souwa



Nasser Mohammed Nasser



Arwa Mohammed Nasser



Fatima Mohammed Nasser



Family of Ali Mohammed Nasser Jaljala:




Ali Mohammed Nasser



Qubla Al-Kharibi Salem



Afrah Ali Mohammed Nasser



Zayda Ali Mohammed Nasser



Hoda Ali Mohammed Nasser



Sheikha Ali Mohammed Nasser



Family of Ahmed Mohammed Nasser Jaljala:




Ahmed Mohammed Nasser Jaljala



Qubla Salem Nasser



Mouhsena Ahmed Adiyou



The dead from the Anbour clan:

Family of Abdullah Mokbel Salem Louqye




Abdullah Mokbel Salem Louqye



Saleha Ali Ahmed Mansour



Ibrahim Abdullah Mokbel Salem Louqye



Asmaa Abdullah Mokbel Salem Louqye



Salma Abdullah Mokbel Salem Louqye



Fatima Abdullah Mokbel Salem Louqye



Family of Ali Mokbel Salem Louqye




Ali Mokbel Salem Louqye



Hanaa Abdallah Monser



Moheile Mohammed Saeed Yaslem


Safaa Ali Mokbel Salem



Khadije Ali Mokbel Louqye



Hanaa Ali Mokbel Louqye



Mohammed Ali Mokbel Salem Louqye



Family of Mokbel Salem Louqye:




Fatima Yaslem Al-Rawami